INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SUBJECT 1.	Communist Th	neory as a Background for ges in the Soviet Union	DATE DISTR.	8 August 1955			
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- To get a clear picture of the significance of the current change in the foreign policy of the USSR, one must bear in mind that the objective of Soviet Communism remains unalterable. It is the Bolshevization of the entire world.
- 2. The only change that ever occurs in Soviet policy is one of approach, i.e., how can its objective best be attained. Within every Communist Party there are fundamentally two factions. They gain the upper hand alternatively according to the situation of the moment, and according to the success or failure of the tactical approach that happens to be employed at any given moment. One faction is entirely imbued with dogma and the revolutionary doctrine. It finds its mainstay in the proletariat, led by the cadres of the Communist parties, and entirely refuses all cooperation or compromises with right-wing groups.
- 3. The other faction not only admits the usefulness of cooperation with nationalistic and reactionary elements, but will, under certain circumstances, consider such cooperation desirable, even at the expense of the proletariat. It will not hesitate to employ this approach if it will serve the purposes of Soviet Communism in the long run and further the long-range plans of Soviet imperialism.
- 4. As long as Stalin was alive, he was the one who decided which tactical approach would be used. His instrument for achieving the fundamental objective of world Bolshevization was the Comintern. During the war he saw fit to disband it, purely for opportunistic reasons. He renewed it under the name of Cominform in 1948, when the Cold War reached a critical stage. But the Cominform proved a failure during the Korean War when it failed to prevent Western intervention in Korea.
- 5. Since 1952, the Cominform has been little more than a debating platform for theoreticians and doctrinaires, without any practical significance. As a result, if the Soviets were to offer the West the dissolution of the Cominform as a

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of the Comintern since been taken Suslov. This b	will, that would be no more than a joke. The erstwhile duties and the task of actual control of world Communism have long a over by the International Bureau in Moscow, headed by M. A. bureau is completely Soviet operated and representatives of non-parties are attached to it at best only as advisors and experts.	
of Europe and pr Soviets fail to a new and aggres stage and if it clandestine, und necessary. When	of the current Soviet maneuvering are, briefly, the neutralization reventing Germany from rearming on the side of the West. If the obtain these, one must expect a resuscitation of the Comintern in sive form. Such an organization already exists in the preparatory should go into operation, it will probably remain largely a terground setup, at least in those countries where that would be a that happens, there will no doubt also be a visible change of higher echelons of the Soviet world.	
the Foreign Suslov.	Section of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, headed by	25 X 1
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